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INTRODUCTION: Throughout the western hemisphere, the period between 1740
and about 1840 represented a new phase in the history of imperialismo It was,
perhaps, the most important century in the history of the Americas. Colonial societies
everywhere started to manifest some profound differences between themselves and
their metropolises, to give themselves some forrn of identity.l This identity might have
been, in the words of Max Savelle, the gerrninating seeds of a forrn of nationalism,
although the concept of the national state more properly belongs to the nineteenth
century.2 Beginning with the British rnilitary surrender at Yorktown in Tidewater,
Virginia, in the fall of 1781, and continuing after the main Spanish royalists reluctantIy
laid down their arrns at Ayacucho high in the cold and windswept Peruvian Andes in
1824, groups of Americans began to carve out political states from once far-flung,
universal empires. These new states did not immediately constitute nations, but they
forrned the geographical preconditions for the intensification and cultivation of the
identities and sensibilities which would, sometime during the nineteenth century,
develop into a full-fledged nationalism.3 In any case, it seems important to understand
and separate the essentially political and rnilitary activities of state forrnation from the
emergence of the complex sentiments associated with the development of nationalism.
Such clarification between the goal of creating a state and the goal of
establishing the nation is essential in understanding the nature of Cuban nationalism
and the manifest reluctance to create a poli tical state. The origins of Cuban nationalism
can be traced alongside its parallel mainland manifestations during the eighteenth
century. Similar economic interests, similar political sensibilities, and similar
geographical self-consciousness to other elites such as those found in Philadelphia,
Boston, New York, Williamsburg, Mexico City, or Quito-existed in Havana or
Santiago de Cuba. Yet Cubans--or more precisely, the dominant class of Cubans-
refused to opt for state formation when their colonial Hispanic brethren on the
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mainland established a number of independent states during the first decades of the
nineteenth century.
The rush to create new polities and the development of a type of political
discourse involving the nature of the state and the legitimacy of the new governments
blurred the essential difference between state formation and national consciousness-
raising during the nineteenth century. In Latin American history, that too is a very
important century, because it signified the break-up of the Spanish American Empire.4
The political consequences of this essentially political disintegration denoted an overt
manifestation of state formation and its corollary, the rise of nationalism. Throughout
the nineteenth century, then, one distinguishes the shattering and reforming ofpolitical
states masking a strong tendency toward localization, Creolization, and
Americanization of the previous colonial societies.5 The process appears quite c1early
in the case of Cuba during the nineteenth century.6
In Latin American historiography both the language and the ideas of artificial
state formation and the sense of nationalism appear to belong to the nineteenth century,
where a long tradition of scholarship and pensador reflections have bounded it with the
three great revolutions-the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the
Haitian Revolution-the French invasion of Spain, and the intellectual restlessness
caught up in the multiple -isms of the nineteenth century: in conservatism, liberalism,
Comtian positivism, social Darwinism, anarchism, and Marxism. Indeed, this
intellectual restlessness coincides with the rise of nationalism in Europe, and the
articulation of a set of ideas that linked nationalism to the subordination of the
individual to a poli tic al state-a state that incorporated four unities: religion, language,
history, and culture.7 But however nationalism was examined, it was tied inextricably
to political independence and self~etermination.8 Nationalism constituted a self-aware
community seeking its geographical territory-presumably one to which it had some
prior c1aim.
But this relationship of nationalism and political independence simply could not
be reconciled with the case of Cuba-as indeed, it could not be reconciled in the case
of any of the emergent American states. Cuba of the nineteenth century demonstrated
no overriding unities, and no irresistible will to forge its own political state before
1868.
Within the context of Spanish American political decolonization, Cuba was a
rather late participant, only breaking free from the empire in 1898. Indeed, the
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nationalist struggle-in the sense of a separatist civil war-did not begin in Cuba until
1868 as a peripheral offshoot of the Glorious Revolution in Spain.9 That was the Ten
Years' War, which began with the famous Grito de Yara on October 10, 1868, on the
middle-sized sugarestate ofCarlos Manuel de Céspedes (1819-1874), La Demajagua,
in Manzanillo, of what was then caUed Oriente province. The Ten Years' War petered
out with the Pact of Zanjón in 1878, but was foUowed by a short, sporadic, futile
military engagement, caUed La Guerra Chiquita, in late 1878-79. While threats and
pronouncements were made in the following years, it was not until the Cuba-Spanish-
American War of 1895-98 that Spain lost its last American colonies, and Cuba gained
a sort of political independence.lO
It was quite clear that political independence had to be separated from the
question of nationalism to understand better the nature of Latin American nationalism.
Moreover, only by doing so will it be possible to trace the origin of Cuban
nationalism, and, by extension, all the other manifestations of nationalism in the
Americas.11
In 1750 the great, significant transformation of the Cuban society had not yet
occurred. Politically, economically, and socially, the Cuban society was a colonial and
dependent society, a1though undergoing some increased pace of change, and on the
verge of the radical transformations associated with the capture of Havana by the
English in 1762, and the extensive reforms of Charles III, beginning in 1764.12 By
1840 the society had achieved a high degree of economic autonomy, self-
consciousness, and political importance far beyond its geographical size. By 1840
Cubans of all sorts were articulating ideas about the future of their society and their
culture.13 Above all, by 1840 the railroad was already introduced into Cuba-thc first
state in Latin America to have a railroad, and more than a decade before the first
Sp111ishrailroad from Madrid to Aranjuez operated.
This study has two objectives. First, it traces the extent of personal wealrh in
Cuba, and examines the web interconnecting wealth, polítical power, and the sense of
naÜonalism that developed in Cuba during the early nineteenth century, and eventually
manifested its poli tic al denouement between 1868 and 1898. This is really an
examination of the way in which the great families accumulated and retained their
wealth.
4
Second, it is necessary to trace the developments in local society and culture,
as well as examine the changing political and economic relationship between the
Spanish metropolis and its Caribbean colony during the periodo
Both these objectives are intrinsically related to the expressions of nationalism
in Cuba during the nineteenth century. Cubans, after all, in trying to defme themselves
positively, began by stipulating what they were not: they were not Spaniards. They
called themselves criollos, as did all other aspiring Spanish-American nationalists.
The term Creo le can be quite confusing and has been employed with varying
definitions in the literature. In this paper, the term Creo le is not used as some socio-
linguists would: as a derivative of something European, as in a language where the
vocabulary remains European and the grarnmar is freely employed such as patois or
papiamento, or French and English Creo le, or pidgin English. Nor does it connote
visions of French colonists in early Louisiana undergoing a nativizing experience.14
Nor does it fully coincide with the definition put forward by Edward Brathwaite in The
Development of Creo le Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820, which admits "some kind of
colonial arrangement with a metropolitan European power, on the one hand, and a
plantation arrangement on the other, and where the society is multiracial but organized
for the benefit of a minority of European origin."15 In Spanish American usage, a
creole connotes anything-person, plant, or animallife-that is of local origin as
distinct from that which is introduced from outside the region.
Throughout this study, then, Creoles are regarded generally as those persons
born in the Americas who have established their roots there and seek to forge their
destinies in their local environment. Like Hawkeye in James Fenimore Cooper's novel
The Last of the Mohicans, published in 1826, Creoles possess-or think they
possess-an accumulated experience that affords them a better understanding of their
environment than their metropolitan or expatriate cousins. Moreover, Creoles are
willing to identify with their new environrnent and to establish local patterns of social
hierarchy. No longer do they wish to fmd social fulfillment in the metropolis.
But since I am using the term in a cultural and political sense, I have expanded
it to include not only those bom in the Americas-in this case in Cuba, specifically-
but those who have married into the group and have otherwise acculturated to the
extent that they identify their interests with those of the locals rather than those of their
metropolitan cohorts.16
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When this Creole self-consciousness manifests itself in political identification,
then I assume a case of local nationalism.17
If this is correct, then there is no doubt that, contrary to what the Trinidadian
historian and former Prime Minister, Eric Williams, said in his From Columbus to
Castro: A History oi the Caribbean18 -the Castro Revolution was a belated attempt
by Cuba to catch up with the nationalist movement elsewhere in the Caribbean-
Cuban nationalism was already alive and well during the early nineteenth century.
Indeed, I maintain that the spirit of nationalism was every bit as alive in Cuba
in 1800 as it was in the United States in 1776, or as it was in those mainland Spanish
American territories that fought for, and won, their independence between 1808 and
1826. The Cuban sense of nationalism was stronger in 1800 than anywhere else in the
Caribbean with the possible exception of French Saint-Domingue, then in the throes of
the revolution that was to create the independent state of Haiti in 1804.19 And Haiti
represented the most thorough revolutionary change throughout the Americas before
the twentieth century.
The main question, of course, is why if Cuban nationalism was so mature in
1800 did it faíl to manifest this fulsomeness in political independence before 1898?
The answer, I think, has to do with the nature of the Cuban elite, their
relationship to the land, with the economic base in sugar and slavery, and with the
demographic structure of a society groping to establish itself within the Atlantic
community in what R. R. Palmer has justifiably called, "The Age of the Democratic
Revolutions."
In the nineteenth century the Cuban elite simply could not risk a democratic
revolution. And indeed, given the age in which they lived, they could not afford any
sort of revolution at all. Revolution jeopardized the social and economic structure that
the Cubans were then constructing. A revolution threatened, directIy or inadvertentIy,
to end with the abolition of slavery thereby curtailing the agricultural revolution on
which they based their political and economic importance.
The evolution of this extraordinary self-consciousness may be examined in
three interrelated aspects: economy, society, and politics.
ECONOMY: Between 1750 and 1840 a series of transformations took place in the
Cuban economy. An intrinsic part of the reforms of Charles 111was the economic
revitalization of the overseas empire as a prelude for converting the system from a
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patrimonial monarchy to a national monarchy, with the overseas territories merely
distant provinees-a concept that the French use today for their Antillean departments.
The fIrst intendant in Cuba was Ambrosio Funes Villalpando Abarca de Bolea,
the Count of Ricla.20 He arrived in 1763, and immediately set abaut reinforcing the
defenses of the island. The MOlTOcastle, partly destroyed by the English, was restored
and enlarged. Two new fortifIcations, Atares and La Cabaña were built, as well as an
arsenal to replace the old one destroyed by the departing English forces. The
authorities divided the city of Havana into barrios, or districts. Each barrio had a
comisario de barrio, appointed by the town council from among the most distinguished
residents. It was during this period, too, that a formal, organized system of street
names was introduced to Ravana, and the deliberate reorganization of the city for
purposes of effective military defense began.21
Although the status of ciudad dated from the Real Cedula of December 20,
1592, Havana was, until well into the eighteenth century, no more than a gran aldea
with a growing population. The construction of the later eighteenth century initiated the
transformation to the elegant, delightful and impregnable city that endured until the
twentieth century. Urban beautification and renovation especially marked the
administrations of Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursua (1766-1771) and Felipe de
Fondesviela y Ondeano, the Marqués de la TOlTe(1771-1777). The Marques de la
TOlTeintroduced proper urban p!anning, built the Alameda de Paula, the docks, and
wharves and began the construction of an eIegant palace for the Captains General
(completed in 1792). In addition, he designed the Prado, the Plaza de Armas, and the
expansive Paseos Extramuros, as well as widened the streets throughout the capital
city. A booming private construction accompanied the public construction. The more
established citizens began to constmct ample town homes of grand designs, double-
storied with verandahs, patios, and entrances of elaborately decorated and hand-carved
mahogany or marble. Indeed, some of the most architectural1y imposing of the
cUlTentIyneglected palaces of Old Havana date from this period.22 By the end of the
eighteenth century when the imposing peripheral wall was completed, Havana, with its
parks, plazas, fountains, and wide avenues, ranked among the most beautiful of
American port cities.
Another activity that derived considerable impetus fram the increased concern
for security and commerce during the eighteenth century was shipbuilding.23 \Vith its
extensive hardwood forests close to a number of natural harbors, Cuba had been a
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major center of activity for Spanish shipbuilding since the early seventeenth century.
With the scarcity of hardwood in Iberia, the importance of Havana was enhanced,
especially as it was designated the major port for assembling theflotas that connected
Spain and the New World. Shipbuilding ceased during the brief English capture of
Havana (1762-63), but construction resumed in 1765 and production increased. Of
the 112 ships built at Havana between 1724 and 1796, some 67 date after 1764. More
important, the warships tended to be larger, carrying twice the number of guns as
those built earlier in the century.24 Obviously, the emphasis on larger vessels with
more cannons on board was a response to the bellicose age and the advance in
maritime technology which accompanied the extensive naval engagements involving
the English, French, Spanish, and, after 1776, the Americans. Nevertheless, the
construction of non-military vessels, especially the ganguiles (fishing boats?) in 1775
and 1791 and the pontones (warehouse vessels) of 1782 and 1791 reflected
improvements and expansion of mari time commercial activity through the port of
Havana, and the enormous expansion of commerce.
The frenzy of new construction, reconstruction, and overall reorganization in
the 1760s and 1770s created some incoveniences and disruptions in the city. The
heavy demand for labor spurred a rapid population growth. A large influx of workers
from Spain (along with the increased military personnel), and prisoners and slaves
from the mainland and the interior of the island all converged on the city.25 The
historian Fernando Portuondo estimates that at one stage about four thousand men
were employed full time on military fortifications alone.26 The main fort at Havana
kept supplies for 5,650 men during peacetime, and twice that number during
wartime.27 One consequence of the rapidity of this population explosion was a
temporary scarcity of food in Havana. The high demand for construction material,
especially bricks, and for wheat flour, encouraged North American traders to penetrate
the Cuban market with impunity, and eventually forced the Spanish government to
recognize and legitimize the trade, as Linda Salvucci illustrates in her dissertation and
articles.28 This North American connection, once legally recognized, expanded
considerably. In 1779 Spain further authorized open trade with the rebellious colonies
under the guise of neutrality, but with the expectation of hurting her old nemesis,
Great Britain. Juan de Miralles was sent secredy to Williamsburg and Philadelphia,
where he established a business partnership with Robert Morris (signer of the
Declaration of Independence and financial wizard of George Washington) with two
8
boats plying regularly between Philadelphia and Havana.29 The establishment oflegal
commerce with the United States of America opened the path for their eventual
cornmercial hegemony in Cuba. Yet the Spanish could not do otherwise. Neither
Spanish agricultural production nor Spanish shipping was adequate for the demands of
the reduced empire.30 Moreover, Spain derived considerable benefit from the
collection of the alcabala, or sales tax, on legal trade.31
If some good citizens of Cuba complained about the changes, the food
scarcity, and the general administrative confusion after 1764, they were quick to
recognize the tangible benefits that the cornmercial and administrative reforms brought.
Cornmunications between Cuba and Spain took a quantum leap with the establishment
of a montWy mailboat between Havana and La Coruña. The old cornmercial monopoly
of the port of Cádiz and the Real CompañIa Mercantil de la Habana effectively ceased
to exist as a number of Spanish ports-Sevilla, La Coruña, Santander, Barcelona,
Málaga, Valencia, and Alicante-gained concessions to trade directly with Cuba.
This opening of trade did not destroy the importance of Cádiz in the Iberian-
American trade system.32 Time had produced useful traditions and organizational
contacts for Cádiz merchants, and they continued to play a dominant role in the
imperial trade well into the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the proportional decline
of Cádiz was significant. In 1775 Cádiz handled 80 of the 169 ships trading between
Spain, the Canary Islands, and Havana, or 47.3 percent of the volume. La Coruña
handled 30 vesse1s, or 17.75 percent. Málaga handled 19 ships, or 11.2 percent.
Barcelona accounted for 15 ships, or 8.89 percent. Santander accounted for 11
vessels, or 6.5 percent. The other mainland Spanish ports-Gijón, Alicante, and
Valencia-handled 8 ships or 4.7 percent, while the Canary Islands accounted for 6
ships, or 3.5 percent of the trade (see Table 2). Even when all ships serviced at
Havana are included, Cádiz still accounted for a respectable 17.7 percent, the highest
by far for any Spanish port.33
By 1778 the Spanish Crown expanded the number of Cuban ports accessible
to Spanish shipping in accordance with the privileges prevailing in Havana since 1764.
Santiago de Cuba, Trinidad, and Batabanó on the southem Cuban coast became open,
or free, ports. Later more Cuban ports on the northem coast were added to the list of
intemational free trade ports: Nuevitas in 1784, Matanzas in 1793, and Remedios in
1796.
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New ports indicated increased commercial activity. But new towns such as
Pinar del Rio, Güines, and Jaruco also arose, with increased opportunities for land
speculation and wealth acquisition.34 The old towns, of course, expanded both in area
and population.35
By 1775 the population of Ravana had mushroomed to about 75,000, or
approximately 44.0 percent of the total island population of 172,000. With 450 annual
sailings, Ravana was already one of the busiest ports in the Americas. Its total of 169
ships ranked below the number for La Guaira on the Venezuelan coast in 1793, but far
above the combined total for the other major Venezuelan ports. The Ravana trade
pattern was also more diversified than any other Spanish or Spanish American port.
For example, while Cádiz handled 47.3 percent of the Ravana ships in 1775, it
handled 68.5 percent of the larger number trading with La Guaira in 1793.
By 1775 Ravana was already a hub of international commerce. The
metropolis, Spain, accounted for only 37.5 percent of its legal shipping.36 Mexico, an
important trading partner, and the source (untiI1807) of the situados, the capital that
virtually subsidized local administrative costs, accounted for 24.4 percent of all
Ravana's maritime activity. At the same time, important links were being forged with
North American ports such as Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York.
The situados were an important source of development capital, amounting to
more than 108 million pesos between 1766 and 1785.37 Although it is extremely
difficult to calculate the impact that this particular influx of capital had, it seems
reasonable to assume a catalytic effect on local cornmercial growth.
The economic expansion brought Cuba into contact with a broader network of
ideas and activities than those emanating from Spain. Some of these ideas encouraged
some Cubans to begin to think of their island and their interests in ways that
emphasized the separate identity of the island, and that eventually led to a divergence
of views on the nature of empire. The articulation of this view constituted a form of
Creole economic nationalism, most frequentIy expressed through the economic
societies and the consulados.38
The economic societies and the consulados were official organs of the Creole
and Spanish oligarchy. Nevertheless, they eventually became useful instruments for
the exercise of public office in the interest of private farnilies. This could be illustrated
by the composition of the Havana consulado, set up at the urging of Francisco de
Arango y Parreño and the Conde de Casa Montalvo on April 4, 1794. Both Arango
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and Casa Montalvo were prominent members of the Cuban plan ter class. Casa
Montalvo ended up as vice-president of the junta, although death cut short his service
the following year. Arango became the chief legal officer, or sindico, and maneuvered
his brother, Ramón de Arango, into being accountant. When Ramón died two yearS
after the establishment of the consulado, Francisco had another brother, Ciriaco de
Arango, nominated over a number of other qualified applicants.39 It is possible to
argue that Arango merely served the interests of his class, and that he was as strong a
hispanophile as any peninsular in the service of the Crown. But he continually put the
interests of his class above those of the empire, siding consistently with the Cuban
planter class against the tobacco monopoly (la factoria) and the imperial tendency
toward neo-mercantilism.4O
Class interests, however, could not remain narrowly confined. Cubans
themselves, even while defining their interests, articulated ideas about a common
identity that transcended class and that clearly differentiated between themselves and
their metropolitan advocates. They produced a number of newspapers and memorias to
reflect, and in some cases to shape, a sort of cornmon public opinion that-as in the
case of the young José Antonio Saco--Ianded them in jail or attracted a sentence of
exile as potential political subversives.41
SOCIETY: One consequence of the tremendous and dramatic transformation of
Cuban society during the period was the diversification of the occupational
opportunities and the accentuation of segmentation and cleavages. The establishment
of new towns with new people provided new opportunities for local individual s to
enter into the arena of local politics. The confusing state of the Cuban land system
meant that litigation between small townfolk-usually using the cabildo--and large
landowners was long and difficult. 42
In 1793 some Indians from the town of Jiguani complained that their lands had
been illegally confiscated by some wea1thy families of Bayamo and Santiago de Cuba.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the original donations of land were made
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the catastrophic decline of the Indian
population in subsequent years had left vacant lands that were successfully
"denounced" by individuals or incorporated into municipal common property.43 In
1794 the priest Carlos del Rey brought legal action against the cabildo of Guanabacoa,
once a predominantIy Indian town, for encroaching on his land and subdividing part of
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it in a general repartimiento.44 The lands in dispute once pertained to the Indians of the
town of Guanabacoa, but since the Indians had either died or intennarried with
Spaniards, the original mercedes had lapsed. Apparently the vecinos, mainly cattle
ranchers, had used the property as ill-defined communal lands until the grand
distribution of 1788. That repartimiento awarded 1,063 lots to residents of the town,
not necessarily to vecinos. Inc1uded among the recipients were 367 women (34.5
percent of all recipients) and two lots to three free coloreds. Del Rey charged that the
cabildo had wantonly distributed land inc1uding land belonging to him, some 10
caballerías (about 333 acres) of his 67 caballería (2,231-acre) estate. The Indians did
not deny that at some time in the past the land was granted to the Convent of San
Antonio in return for instruction of the locals. But they defended their action on two
ingenious legal grounds that won some sympathy in court. In the fust place they
c1aimed a breach of contract. The priests had not provided the education and therefore
forfeited their right to the land. As such the cabildo was free to redistribute it in any
manner it wished. The second argument was far more troublesome to the entire landed
elite of Cuba. For the Guanabacoans charged that Carlos del Rey was not a resident or
vecino of Guanabacoa, and therefore had no right to mercedes of lands within the
jurisdiction of the town.
Within the fonnal jurisdiction of the town, however, were a great number of
the haciendas of the great farnilies of Havana, including Doña Michaela Bacalao, Don
Gabriel de Castro Palomino, Doña Theresa Ambulodi, and the Condesa viuda de
Macuriges. Through the Consulado of Havana they filed briefs as friends of the
plaintiff in late 1797, some three years after the case had fust been sent to Spain.45
A1though I have not been able to fmd the legal outcome of the case, it is almost cenain
that the cabildo did not succeed. The arguments of the Consulado were that del Rey
and others lived in Havana, but paid taxes on their land, including levies by the
cabildo, in Guanabacoa-and such cases were clear threats to the use of propeny and
threatened the future economic development of the island. The Cuban elite had come to
the rescue of one of its members, and it made clear the obstacles that the pattern of
landholding and land use presented to the economic development of the colony. Other
cases such as this forced the Crown to abolish usufructal tenure in 1816.46 Both the
elite and the economy were then expanding drarnatically.
Along with an economically vibrant society went a class confident of its
abilities and comfonable in its relationship to power and status. This was the Cuban
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elite of the later eighteenth century: families such as the Arango y Parreño, de las
Casas, Montalvo, O'Farrill, Calvo de la Puerta, Peñalver, Beltrán de Santa Cruz,
Barreto, Zayas Bazan, Mateo Pedroso, Herreras, Nuñez del Castillo, Recio de
Oquendo, and Kindelán.47 These families demonstrated the cornmon eighteenth
century pattem of intermarriage and overlapping participation in church, bureaucracy,
economy, and milítary.
POLITICS: The Cuban Creole elite intersected the polítical process at two levels. At
the first level they participated in the imperial bureaucracy that was expanding
considerably after the wide-ranging reforms beginning in 1763. Cuba became the
experimental garden for the type of political reforms that were later transferred to the
mainland, often with modifications. This level has been well treated by AlIan Kuethe
in his wonderful study, Cuba, 1753-1815. Crown, Military and Society (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
The second level was that of staff positions at the level of local town councils
and other minor local offices, or established boards such as the consulado. These were
extremely important positions for exploiting public office for private ends and were
cornmonly used to acquire, expand, consolidate private wealth and polítical power.48
The idea of publíc service, altruistically unrelated to the pursuit of private ends,
was alien to the times. Families found that their overlapping connections in the arrny,
the church, and the bureaucracy were extremely useful attributes, especialIy when the
appeal to the variousfueros of these organizations could enable them to avoid debt or
embarrassment. 49
High incidences of these overlapping were found among the Creo le elite
families of Cuba. For example, at least nine of the seventeen members of the Havana
City Council in 1762 were related by marriage or kinship. Pedro Beltrán de Santa Cruz
and Miguel Calvo de la Puerta, the two Alcaldes ordinarios, were cousins as welI as
brothers-in-Iaw. Sebastian and Gabriel Peñalver, regidores (aldermen), were father
and son.
Jacinto Tomás Barreto, the Head ofthe Havana Rural Constabulary (or Alcalde
Mayor de la Santa Hermandad), was married to the daughter of Sebastian Peñalver,
and therefore was the brother-in-Iaw of Gabriel. Barreto was also the first cousin of
Mateo Pedroso---one of the two Regidores perpetuos (permanent alderman), along
with Pedro Beltrán de Santa Cruz-the multimillíonaire Havana merchant, planter, and
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entrepreneur. And Barreto's first wife was a sister of Cristobal Zayas Bazan, the
síndico (receiver of fines).
This pattern of relationship, common in the Havana town council, was
characteristic of the elite. The Montalvo family, which carne to Cuba in 1734, married
into the Ramirez, O'Farril, Chacón, Arango, and Pedroso families by 1800. Mateo
Pedroso (1719-1800), of whom we have made mention, had fourteen children,
sufficient for distribution among the Herreras, the Recio de Oquendo, O'Farrill, and
Chacón families. Pedroso's ancestors served with the Inquisition in Cuba; and his
father was for many years the municipal treasurer-perhaps the public basis for his
private wealth. The same intermarrying could be established for the Arangos, the
Herreras, the Calvo de la Puerta, or any of the other great families.
These families acquired titles with their wealth and established mayorazgos in
Cuba, and continued to playa role in Cuban politics during the nineteenth century.50
Indeed, by 1840, Cuba boasted thirty-four Marquesses and thirty-two Counts-three
of whom were Grandees of the Spanish Realm. Yet, their identification was with
Cuba, rather than with Spain, as the pattern of marrying cousins, nieces, nephews,
and uncles indicated. Many of them considered themselves to be Cubans, not Spanish;
and while they may have supported Spanish government in Cuba their support was
premised on the conviction that it served their ends better than any of the possible
alternatives. And indeed, not many of these families left Cuba after its poli tical
independence in 1898.
For the elite to demonstrate nationalist rather than oligarchic sentiments,
however, they had to think and act on behalf of a broader constituency than their
relatives and their class. This is not very easy to establish for the uppermost members
of the Cuban elite. Nevertheless, I think that sufficient evidence exists to illustrate how
ideas of collective self-consciousness expanded among Cubans and percolated
downward from the elite to the public at large. EIsewhere in my writings 1 have
referred to this as a sense of patriachiquismo, the sensibility of belonging to a little
fatherland, a strong local identification-in short, a nationalism without a nation
state.51 Essentially, this was the gradual awareness of Cubans that their interests were
different from those of Spain, and while they rnight remain colonial subjects, this self-
consciousness militated against their remaining Spanish.
This awareness may be deduced in a number of ways. It was the type of
evidence from observations as simple, but as important, as the titles of newspapers
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and broadsheets. During the period it is possible to see a significant shift in the titles
and the content of newspapers. Until the end of the eighteenth century, these local
publications in Cuba were called, as they were in Spain, Las Noticias, El Tiempo,
Revista, or the simple, generic term, periódico.
The first newspaper in Havana was started in 1724 under official auspices by
the Conde de Ric1a, then the Captain-General of Cuba. Despite its sponsorship, and
the fact that it carried important official news, La Gaceta de la Habana, as it was called,
folded shortIy after publication. Soon thereafter, another paper emerged, probably the
mouthpiece of the Havana elite, called El Pensador. Already one can detect a change in
attitude. By the early nineteenth century, newspapers began to have different titles, El
Americano, Diario de la Habana, El Español Libre, El Amigo de la Constitución, El
Amante de sí mismo, or El Habanero, published out of Philadelphia by the exiled
priest, Felix Varela y Morales. Varela described himself in 1821 as "Un hijo de la
libertad, un alma americana (A son ofliberty, an American spirit")."52
One may also note that in September 1822 the young José Antonio Saco
published a piece in the new Gaceta de la Habana under the pseudonym "Amigo del
Orden" in which he defined himself not only as a constitutionalliberal, but also as an
American who expected to be in charge in his own house.53 This seems like a patent
manifestation of Cuban self-interest in constitutionalism at the time, and probably
reflects the separation of the Spanish and Cuban identities.
The same observation could be made about the names of haciendas: from a
preponderance of saints' names to a plethora of secular names. In the earlier eighteenth
century, the names of saints prevailed: Santa Teresa, Santa María, Santa Rita, Santa
Isabel, La Concepción, El Salvador, and San Francisco. By the early nineteenth
century the names were Unión, Flor de Cuba, La Esperanza, Aurora, Amistad, Dos
Hermanos, La Gran Azucarera, and other such secular names.54 (Needless to say,
given the strong Roman Catholic persuasion, saints' names would remain a popular
choice until the Castro Revolution.)
By separating the issue of nationalism from the political creation of the state,
the problems of the nineteenth century become much clearer. If in Cuba nationalism
appeared before the state, it might be possible to show that on the mainland-inc1uding
in the United States-the state appeared before the full manifestation of a sense of
nationalism. By comparing Cuba with the events on the mainland (inc1uding the
United States) it should be possible to delineate the rise of nationalism and the
15
disintegration of imperial structures. It also demonstrates the importance of the series





















































Nra. Sra. Del Carmen
San Cristobal/Segundo Constante
San José/El Africa
Nra. Sra. Del Pilar/Europa
Nra. Sra. De Loreta/Asia
Sta. Trinidad/Esperanza
San Cristobal/Triunfo
Nra. Sra. De Belen/America
Santa Barbara/Estrella
Santo Cristo De Burgos/Castilla
Santa Rosa De Lima/Dragón
Nra. Sra. De Guadalupe/Bízarra
San Ignacio/Invencible







































TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796
TYPE Nl\ME
Warship Nra. Sra. Del Rosario/Nueva España




" Sta. Teresa De Jesus
Jesus María Y José/Nuevo Conquistador 64
64
"





" San Luis Gonzaga/Infante






Packet Boat San BIas/Volante


























































































San Francisco De Paula














1773 Warship San Miguel
1775 " San Ramon
Fishing Boat(?) [Ganguil] San Julian
" San Salvador De Orta
1776 Friga te Sta. Agueda
Brigantine Sta. Catalina Mártir
1777 Frigate Sta. Cecilia
1778 " sta. Matilde
Schooner Sta. Teresa
Frigate Nra. Sra. De La O.




1781 " El Viento De Barlovento
1782 Packet Boat Borja
Warehouse Ship San Pedro
" San Pablo
1786 Warship San Hipo1ito/Mexicano
" Conde De Regla
Frigate Guadelupe
1787 Warship Real San Carlos
Frigate La Catalina

























El Infante Don Pe1ayo 74
Ceres 40
Gloria 44













TABLE 1: (cont'd) SHIPS BUILT AT THE HAVANA ARSENAL, 1724-1796
TYPE GUNSNAME
Frigate Nra. Sra. Las Mercedes 40





Warehouse Ship No. 1
" No. 2
Fishing Boat [Gangui11 No. 1
" (?) [Gangui11 No. 2
No. 3" "







Source: Compiled from Antonio J. Valdes, Historia de la Isla
de Cuba (Madrid, 1813; New Edition, Havana: UNESCO,
1964) pp. 284 - 289
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'rABIE 2: WúUTIME TAADE THROUGHHAVANA, 1775
% % %
POR!' NO. OF SAILINGS TOI'AL SPANISH TOI'AL AMERICAN TOI'AL
A. S pa i n 169 37.5 100.0
La Coruña 30 6.6 17.8
eadiz 80 17.7 47.3
Santander 11 2.4 6.5
Barcelona 15 3.3 8.9
Gijon 2 0.4 1.2
Malaga 19 4.2 11.2
Alicante 5 1.1 3.0
Valencia 1 0.2 0.6
Islas Canarias 6 1.3 3.6
B. The Americas 281 62.4 100.0
Campeche 37 8.2 13.2
New Orleans 49 10.8 17.4
Kingston, Jarraica 16 3.5 5.7
Barbados 4 0.9 1.4
Vera Cruz 53 11.8 18.9
M3.racaibo <1 0.9 1.4
P\:erto Rico/S te. IDltLngo 4:' 9.6 15.3
Tampico 18 4.0 6.4
Cartagena 29 6.4 10.3
Qroa 7 1.6 2.5
Coatzacoalcos 2 0.4 0.7
La Guaira 8 LB 2.8
% % % %
PORl' NO. OF SAILIN::;S TOl'AL SPANISH TCYl'AL AMERICAN TC1l'AL
Sto Eustatius 4 0.9 1.4
Others 7 1.6 2.5
'lbtal Saili~s 450
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TABLE 2: (cont 'd) MARITL'1E TRADE THROUGHHAVANA, 1775
Source: Archivo General de Irrlias. (Seville). Santo Dciirl.ngo. legajo
1520. Aro de 1775. Relación de las embarcaciones ~ han










L IBRF.~ 1:'<:('T \nAC cUea 111
*'~Mulatos Negros Mulatos Negros Total ~MulatasNegras Mulatas Negras Total o~~f-I
Habana................... 6,331 3,982 2,093 685 13,242 145,433 17,06 3,297 2,473 369 6,985 30,185 75,618
Santiago de las Vegas.... 717 86 23 10 164 1,000 59 69 30 5 112 809 1,809
San Felipe y Santiago.... 582 ~O 1:4 6 728 1,410 49c 44 25 . . . . 154 722 2,132
Filipinas................ 995 285 13 26 299 1,623 65 195 21 8 118 994 2,617
Isla de Pinos............ 31 15 3 1 20 70 4 2 1 ... . 1 8 78
Santa Maria del Rosario.. 1,080 32 113 114 362 1,701 894 31 92 7 173 1¡197 2,898
Guanabacoa............... 2,639 157 230 32 2,392 5,450 1,594 119 161 15 659 2,548 7,998
Jaruco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
:\
243 11 1 . . . . 84 339 168 10 . . . . . . . . . 19 197 536
Matanzas................. 1,~63 99 75 10 505 1,852 85/1 84 73 5 381 1,397 3,249
Tota1....................p3,781 3.817 2,600 884 17,796 58,878 22.319 3,851 2,876 409 8,602 38,057 96,935
Remedios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.044 113 90 35 282 1.564 l,íJ52 98 117 38 216 1,521 3,085
Santa Clara.............. 3,071 468 363 250 327 4,479 2,539 284 177 198 426 3,624 8,103
Trinidad................. 1,736 199 248 102 611 2,896 1,784 219 231 83 401 2,718 5,614
Santi-Espiritus.......... 2,951 429 196 146 536 4,258 2,682 475 237 103 510 4,007 8,265
Principe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,061 417 430 267 1,936 7,111 4,293 517 746 299 1,372 7,221 14,332__._0
T o tal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,863 1,626 1,327 800 3,692 20,308 12,350 1,593 1,502 721 2,925 19,091 29,399
,
3,305 1,5331 325 244 930 6,337 2,690 1,680 485 287 771 5,913 12,250Bayamo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baracoé.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 691 6181 103 50 101 1,563 310 209 71 41 28 659 2,222
!lolguin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,036 144 124 41 102 1,447 570 224 55 78 66 993 2,240
Cub2... . . .... .. . .......... 3,900 2,4631 1,472 1,499 2,632 12,966 2,625 1,449 700 670 964 6,408 19,374
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,932 4,7581 2,024 1,834 3,765 22,313 6,195 3,562 1,311 1,076 1,829 13,973 36,286
Total general.. ..........55,576 10,201 5,951 3,518 25,253 101,49c 40,864 9,006 5,689 2,206 13,356 71,121 172,620
TABLE 3: CENSO DEL AÑO DE 1774
Source: Ramon de la Sagra, Historia económico- política de la isla de Cuba (Havana: Arazeza y Soler, 1831)





HOMBRES MUGERES GI1/) ~DO
o
CJ CJ~c:: LIBRES ESCLAVOS c:: LIBRES ESCLAVAS 11I11I 11I
~~~M.ulatas
o
I'Q Mulatos Neltros Mulatos Ne2ros Total I'Q Ne2ras Mulatas Ne2ras Total f-'
Habana y arrabales....... 12,274 2,481 1,944 251 6,864 23,814 11,263 2,911 2,464 231 10,624 27,493 51,307
Santiago de las Vegas.... 1,127 57 38 27 1,061 2,310 1,156 63 43 36 1,131 2,429 4,739
San Felipe y Santiago.... 601 35 19 5 522 1,182 497 43 19 7 205 771 1,953
Filipinas................ 1,353 533 59 27 360 2,332 1,035 501 61 17 246 1,860 4,192
Isla de Pinos............ 50 3 1 3 17 74 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 82
Santa Maria del Rosario.. 1,291 30 238 30 312 1,901 1,257 46 219 37 438 1,997 3,808
Guanabacoa............... 3,278 327 244 125 1,878 5,852 3,259 400 282 149 1,783 5,873 11,725
~aruco................... 503 9 8 .. . 140 660 425 3 7 . . . 69 504 1,164
I-Iatanzas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,945 266 406 160 996 3,773 1,473 224 2 111 633 2,443 6,216
~artidos del campo....... 21,066 2,038 1,800 640 15,860 1,404 14,440 1,460 1,520 690 6,340 24,450 65,854
i o t:11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43,488 5,779 4,757 1,268 28,010 83,302 34,813 5,651 4,617 1,278 21,'.69 67,828 151,130
Remedios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,248 432 538 271 965 4,454 2,315 4,042 516 286 690 7,849 12,303
Santa Clara............. 4,141 767 388 352 370 6,018 2,645 666 426 380 340 4,457 10,475
Trinidad............... . 2,612 1,143 766 309 1,440 6,270 2,274 1,262 878 425 502 5,341 11,611
Santi-Espiritus.......... 2,375 1,036 699 260 1,285 5,655 2,055 1,127 811 397 454 4,841 10,496
Principe. . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . .
7,214 971 793 988 4,605 14,571 7,402 763 717 736 3,329 12,947 27,518
18.5901
.--- --- - --.-- f-_._-
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 , 349 3,184 2,180 8,665 36,968 6,691 7,860 3,348 2,224 5,312 35,435 72,403. --- .-- -- --_.-, I
I Bayamo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'1
3,732 2,712 179 1,680 1,634 9,937 3,119 1,287 1,547 2,213 1,701 9,867 19,804
,Baracoa. ............ .. .. 490 585 16 20 69 ,180 396 604 109 21 56 1,186 2,366
I
llolguin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,007 377 151 165 234 2,934 2,021 394 134 164 190 2,903 5,837
!;
I




ITotal.......... ......... ~10,2211 5,717 1,425 2,321 4.980 124,664 9,756 4,530 2,935 2,864 4,019 24,104 48,~
generaL.......... h2,299115,845 9'36615,769
I
Total 41,655 144,931¡ 61.260 18,041 10,900 6,366 30,800 127,367 272,301
I ., I
I I
Source: same as Table 3
-~----- -
T ABLE 4: CENSO DEL AÑO DE 1792
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